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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JACK LE HOY MECHAM, JULIA
HU'l1H SMO(Yl', 'L1HELMA MECHAM
HIN'L1ZE, J. HALPH MECHAM, and
FIH:-l'l1 NATIONAL BANK OF UTAH,
Administrator of the Estate of SOPHIA
0. MECHAM, Deceased,

Plavntiffs-Respo11dents,

vs.

Case No.

11749

MEL-0-TONE ENTERPRISES IN CORPORATED, a Utah Corporation,
and BARBY'S CAFES INCORPORATED, a Utah Corporation,

Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
OF THE KIND OF CASE
'Phis is an action by Plaintiffs to t1uiet title to certain real estate in themselves.
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT
Plaintiffs, the fee ownern of the real estate in question, moved the lower court for Smrnnary Judgment
against the Defendants, who claim their interest in said
real estate through an auditor's tax deed. The trial court
granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
quieting title in the Plaintiffs, and res(•rving to the Deft>ndallt:-; a lien against tlw real estate for part of the
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taxes paid by tht> Defendants, or their predecessors in
interest, and further reser\'ing to the Defendants any
rights they may have as occupying claims of said real
estate. From said order, the Defendants appeal.
RELIEF SOUGH'L1 ON APPEAL
Defendants seek reversal of the Decree quieting
title in the Plaintiff's and desire that the case be remanded to the lower court for a trial on the merits.
Defendants further seek an order of this Court awarding them their costs of this Appeal.
STATEMENT OF F AiCTS
Plaintiffs instituted this action for the purpose of
quieting title in themselves to the real estate which is
the subject matter of this lawsuit (R. 1-2). Plaintiffs
claim their interest in the real estate as fee owners
thereof (R. 8-9). Defendants claim their interest in the
real estate as successors in interest by and through an
auditor's tax deed (R. 9-10).
Salt Lake County caused the property in question
to be sold for delinquent sewer taxes (R. 17 & 20). Subsequent to said sale, the Salt Lake County Auditor
executed a tax deed in favor of Defendant's predecessors
in interest (R. 9, 11, & 17). The tax deed given by the
Salt Lake County Auditor was in the statutory form as
provided in cases of tax sales for general taxes. The
deed recites on its face that the property "was sold to
said county at ]ffPliminary sale for non-payment of
ge1wral taxes." Said tax deed on its upper, left-hand
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L'.orner ls rnark<:>d b:· a11 identifieatiou number, with an
indication that the ddirn1twnt tax(•::; in question were
tl10::;p resnlting from a ::wwer a::;::;es::;rnent (R. 17).
Beeamw of the ne1:·d to n·view detailed and complex
record::; of the Salt Lah· County 'l'rea::-;urer's Office, thP
Salt Lake Connt:· Auditor's Offiee and the Salt Lake
County Rt.;eorder 's Offi<-'.e, a11 ""'\.n::;wer \\·a:s not immediate!:·
ln addition, lwean::-;P of the pressing and
lieav:· work load of the Trea:sun>r'::; Offiee and Recorder's
Offiee in the earl.'» part of HHiS, wl1ich \ms created by
tax collection problem::;, this aut110r was miable to obtain
a recorder's eertificate and entified COJJY of the tax
sale record. Accordingl:·, a general denial \\·as interposed
in behalf of Defendants on March 7, 1969, to allow DPfrndants adequate time to disco\'er the necessary facts
and obtain the auditor's certifieate so that a detailed
answer could be later filed (R. 7).
Notwithstanding the laek of pertinent documents
and evidence in the fill>, Plaintiff's moved for Summary
.T ndgment on April 9, 19G9 ( R. lS). Thi::; author was
finall:· able to obtain a certified copy of the tax sale
record on April 28, 1969.
In addition to tlw foregoing vroblems concerning
filing of a detailed pleading, this author made it
known to Mr. Lewis S. Livingston, one of the attorneys
for Plaintiff, that the Defendants intended to make and
a:-;sert claims as an occnpying claimant, and this author
advist>d Mr. Li\·ingston that additional time ·would be
n•qni red to obtain an a<-'.counting and the invoices in
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support thereof in connection with improvements made
upon the real estate which is the subject of this lawsuit.
Ignoring the need for additional time for the Defendants to coumnmicate as to an accounting concerning
improvenwnts made upon the property, and the completion of a more complete responsive pleading, Plaintiffs noticed up their l\Iotion for Summary Judgment
for l\lay 2G, 1969 (R. 2±). Pursuant to said notice, the
Court went forward on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, and notwithstanding the incompleteness of
the file. Plaintiffs were granted Smnmary Judgment
after both parties orally argued the matter, and submitted supporting memorandums (R. 32).
Although an examination of the Salt Lake County
Records -..rnuld disclose that Salt Lake County held a
preliminary sale for sewer taxes for the year of 1967,
and that a further examination of the records would
disclose that Mel-0-Tone Enterprises paid said taxes
in the amount of $42.75, plus penalty, interest and costs,
or a total of $47.87, Judgment was rendered by the
lower court without any prot(•ction of Defendants' statutory lien rights for the delinquent 1967 sewer taxes paid
(R. 3).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE AUDITOR'S TAX DEED ON WHICH DEFENDANTS RELY IS VALID ON ITS FACE, AS
A MATTER OF LAW.

Sections 17-6-3.4 and 17-G-3.6, Utah Code Annotated
1953, provide that the enforcement of sewer taxes shall
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be handlc•d in all re:->peds a:-; general county taxes. Spe('ifically,
17-G-3.4 providt>s that "ail laws applicable to the imposition, collection and enforcement of
general county taxt>:->, induding those pertaining to the
allowance of collection foes, to tlw imposition of penalties
for delinquencies and to the :;ale of property for nonpayment of taxe:;, shall be avvlicable to the taxes so
levied for the di :-;trict." ( 1£m phasis added.) Section
17-(5-3.G indicates that ll]Jon cntification of delinquent
:->e\\·pr charges to eith<,r the County Treasurer or County
Assessor that they
become a lien on the delinquent premises on a
parity with and collectible at the same time and
in the same manner as general county taxes are
a lien on such premises and are collectible. All
methods of enforcement available for the collection of such general county taxes, including sale
of the delinquent premises, shall be available and
shall be used in the collection of delinquent sewer
charges.
Aecordingly, tlw ('mplo_\·ment by the County Treasurer and Count.'· Auditor of the provisions of Chapter
10, Title 59, Utah Cod<· Annotated 1953, to collect delinquent sewPr taxes is not invalid, since the quoted portions of the above cited statutt•s expressly empower and
reqnire that sewer taxes be collected in the same fashion
followed in this case. 'fhe only form of tax deed as prescribt>d h.'· the :-;tatutes is set forth in Section 59-10-64
(5), Utah Code Annotafrd 1%3, and that form was employed h.'· the Nalt Lak\' Count_\· Auditor in the case
lwforP this l'onrt. Although the paragraph ending the
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body of the auditor's tax dPed states that the property
"\vas sold to said county at preliminary sale for nonpayment of gen<-'ral taxes," the delinquent taxpayer is
put on notice that the sale took place as a result of a
sewer tax delinquency. rrhe identification number stamped in the upper, left-hand corm·r, and the indication that
the tax was for ''sewer", is an explicit and express
reference to the appropriate county tax sale record. The
Salt Lakt• County Auditor followed the express statutory mandates in connection with sale procedures followed, and the ultimate granting of a tax deed. Accordingly, it is submitted that said tax deed is not invalid
on its face, as a matter of law.
POINT II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPERLY
AND PREMATURELY GRANTED BY THE LOWER
COURT.

This Court has consistently recognized the harshness and the many dangers implicit in the granting of
smmnary relief under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The cases are legion in snvport of this proposition; however, Defendants merely call attention to the
case of Tanner v. Utah Poultry & Farmers Cooperative,
11 U.2d 353, 359 P.2d 18 (Utah 1969). At page 19 this
Court indicates that the Summary Judgment remedy
"is appropriate only where the favored party makes a
showing which precludes, as a matter of law, the awarding of ((ny relief to tht· losing part.''·" (Emphasis addPd.)
It seems patently avparent from the record that the
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lower cumt ha:; deprived the Defendant::; of valuable
right:; and relief, otherwi::;e allowable in this case.
S1Jecifically, a lien i::; available to Defendants for
$103.41 for the delinquent :;ewer taxes which were recovered by Salt Lake County as a rewlt of the tax
:;ale in question and a lien i::; available to Defendants
in the amount of $-156.77 for 1968 general property
taxes paid by the Defendants. The::;e amounts were resened a:; lien:; under the Decree of Sunnnary Judgment awarded by the lower court; however, the lien::>
re::;erved to Defendant::; under Section 59-10-65, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, are intere::;t bearing, and the
lower court's Decree makes no provision for continuing
interest. In addition, the Decree of the lower court made
no provision for the 19G7 sewer taxes paid by Defendant::; in the amonnt of $47.87, plu::; accruing interest. To
be sure, evidence of this latter tax is absent from the
file, but given adequate time to tie discovery matters
down, it is submitted that this would become part of
the matters plead, a:; it should pro1wrly be.
rrhe Decree of the lower court, \Vhile preserving two
of the three outstanding liens accorded the Defendants
by statnte, fails to make any provision therein for forclo:-mrt>. Section 59-10-G5, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
lffO\'idPs that tax liens ''shall be foreclosed in any action
\\'herein the invalidity of such tax title is determined. If
;-;ueh lien is not foreclosed at the time of the determination of th<' invalidity of ;-;udt tax title, any later action
suel1 lien shall be forever barred ... " Alto
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though at first blush it seems that the lower court protected and preserved outstanding rights of the Defendants, the Decree nonetheless effectively takes away
valuable rights of the Defendants, as is apparent from
the cited statute.
This Court construed a similar lien statute in the
case of San Juan County v. Jen, Inc., 16 U.2d 394, 401
P.2d 953 (Utah 1965). The Court concluded that the
statute involved created only lien rights, and not any
in personam rights as against the owner. Therefore,
Defendants respectfully submit that the only remedy
available Defendants is a foreclosure action, and if they
cannot bring such an action, they are forever barred.
This would seem to be further supported by the "oneaction" rule which is followed in this jurisdiction in
connection 'vith the foreclosure of mortgages on real
estate.
Since the Defendants took occupancy of the premises
in question, they have expended large sums of money,
and would make claim therefore for valuable improvements rendered as occupying claimants under the purview of Chapter 6 of rritle 57, Utah Code Annotated
1953. It would seem that it would be more economical,
considering the expenses to the parties and the time
and expense to the Court, for the Court to dispose of the
occupying claimants' rights as a part of this lawsuit.
Moreover, Section 57-6-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
indicates that the Plaintiff shall not be put in possession of the property until there has been a full corn-
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pliance with the Clia1)ter. According!>·, until there has
lwPn a trial 011 the merits, it s<:>ems dear under the
statute that the Plaintiffs, though the trial court has
quiett>d title in them, a1·e not entitled to pos::;ession of
the premises, and an· t 1 nahle to move forward with a
disposition thereof.
POINT III
THE APPLICATION OF THE APPLICABLE
LAW BY THE LOWER COURT CONSTITUTES A
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY TO THE DEFENDANTS, VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

The Fourtt:•enth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States pro,·ides that no "state [shall] deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.... " Section 1 of Article 1, Constitution
of U tali, accords to the citizens of the State the inalienable right to "acquin·, possess and protect property... ",
and Section 7 of Article 1, Constitution of Utah, pro,·ides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without dne process of law." This Court
in tlw case of Christiansen v. Harri::;, 109 Utah 1, 163
P.:Zd 314 (Utah 19-±5), at Page 316 indicates that each
party is entitled to his day in court, "with the privilege
of being heard and introducing evidence to establish his
cau.se or his defen::;c ... " (Emphasis added.) Also, the
Court alludes to the standard definition which indicates
that a conrt shonld render jndgment only after trial. It
is appan•nt that ])pfendants have been deprived of their
day in court in thi::; case.
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'rhe Legislature has granted certain protection to
tax deed purchasers, or tlws(_' holding under them, in
clear and unambiguous language. Section 59-10-64 ( 7),
Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides that "a copy of the
record of the tax sale and a copy of the auditor's endorsement made thereon, duly certified by the recorder
under the seal of his office, shall be lJrima-facie evidence
in all courts of the com·eyance to the county in fee simple
of the property therein described and of the regularity
of all proceedings preliminary thereto." l\loreover, Subsection 5 of the same Statute lJrovides that when the
auditor executes and delivers his tax deed that it "shall
be prima-facie evidence of all proceedings subsequent
to the preliminary sale and of the conveyance of the
property to the grantee in fee simple." Certainly without more, it seems plainly clear that the Legislature intended that tax title purchasers, or successors in interest,
would be entitled to their day in court to protect valuable
property interests, which they have acquired under the
Statutes of the Statt>s of Utah. Before the lower court
entertained any .Motion for Snuunary Judgment, it first
should have inquired into the circumstances surrounding the assessment, levy and sale, and notices thereof,
and the circumstances nndeT which the Plaintiffs failed
to meet their tax liabilities. 'l'he rPcord itself indicates
that Plaintiffs wen• guilty of several lapses in paying
the taxes on the property in question, so it well could
be concluded that there might have been some willful
ignoring of the law, a suhj1·ct into which it is
the trial court should }iayp made some inquiry.
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The failure of the lower court to prnvide for foredmmre of D('fondants' lit·ns, which an; allovved the Defrndants un<lPr Sedion 39-10-05, lJtah Code Annotated
1953, in its Decree t1uieting title in the Plaintiffs, obviousJ.v deprives Defendants of valuable propert.\· rights ·without DuP Prncess of La\Y. Since the lower court has invalidated the tax. deed under \\ ltieh Defendants claim,
a11<l since Section 59-10-ii5 nt·at1:>s a "one-action" rule
'
tlw Defrndants liaH not been ginn their day in court.
.Jloreowr, the Defendants have not liad tlH•ir day in court
concerning any claims they may have as occnp:·ing claimants of the property in question.
Although this Court in ib prior decisions has judicially legislated mrny man:· of tlH.' rights afforded by
the Legislature to tax d(•Pd purchasers, or their successors, it is respectfully
that tlwre has been
;;0111P recognition of this fact b:· thP Court. 8pecifically,
in the case of Toronto ,.. Sht'ffidd, llS Utah ±60, 222 P.2d
G94 (Utah 1950), the late and estee1w•d Justice \Volfe,
in his concurring opinion, allndPd to tltP very problem
rnis(•d by this cast>. At PagPs 603 and GO±, Justice ·wolfe
pointed out that tl1P courts bear 80llH' rPs1wnsibility for
the muddled situation concerning tax titles. HP indicated
that tlwre should be ::;0111e relaxation of the "strict compliance'' doctrine. Where tlwrP han• been simple administrative ornis::;ion::; or
not prPjudicial
to the taxpa:·er, he suggpsh>d that such tt>clmical defects
sl10uld not aid thP dPlinqnent taxpayer. To be sure, the
taxpa.\·1·r is (•ntitlPd to e(•rtain proh>ctions which the
statut(•s adPquatt>l:· insure. Hmrev(•r, he should not be
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allowed to sit idly by while thl• county proceeds to sell
his valuable property, and then later make entreaties to
the court that he sl1011ld be put back in his previous position, at the expense of another e<1nally important citizen.
The tax deed purchaser, or his successor in interest,
should be able to place some reliance upon the explicit
statutes of this state iu evaluating what potential property rights they may acquire, or may have acquired.
Based upon a reading of the statute:-;, the tax deed purchaser is then lulled into a sPnse of :some security, and
may then go forward with large expenditures of money
to alter or impron:: the property, as is the case with Defendants herein. In a different context, it would seem
that the judicial legislation prevalent in this area of the
law might be rightly constrn<:>d and held to be entrapment.
CON<;LU8ION
Reviewing the record in the light most favorable
to the Appellants, it must bl' concluded that the lower
court has deprived Appt>llants of valuable property
rights, without any consideration therefor. Notwithstanding the fact that there had never been any Notice of
Readiness for Trial filed with the court, and notwithstanding the fact that both parties had conducted some
of their discovery work ov<:>r many months, the lower
court chose to dispose of the whole case on a very
narrow, legal point, disposing of all possible issues, without the advantag<· of all the evidence before the court.
Accordingly, Defondants-Appt>llants have been deprived
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of thPir
in court, and their opportunity to be heard
at> to
important it>t>ues bearing on the preservation
of valuable pro1wrty righb granted them under the
StatntPs of the State of Utah.
lt is l'('t>pedfnlly t>tdnnitted that this Court must
rcverne tht• lo\Yer conrt, and the cat>e 8hould be remandPd to the lower court for a trial on the merits.
Costs should])(' awarded Ap1Jellant8.
Re8pectfully 8Ubmitted,
RIGTRUP

±GG East 5th South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Coun8el for Appellants

